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Background: What are now increasingly called individual based models (IBMs) have 
been used in ecology since the 1970s when theoretical ecology began in earnest. The 
best known examples from that time include the forest computer simulation model 
(named JABOWA) of Daniel Botkin (Botkin et al 1972) and the computer simulation 
model of Donald DeAngelis (DeAngelis et al 1991) for a freshwater fish cohort. These 
were identified with the systems ecology school of theoretical ecology and the approach 
was anticipated to offer a unifying theoretical framework for ecology (Huston 1988), a 
goal whose possibility is still being debated (Roughgarden 2009, Vellend 2010). Since 
then hundreds of IBMs have been published in ecology. Moreover, IBMs are being 
actively developed in other disciplines, especially the social sciences, and dozens of 
software environments have been created to facilitate IBM research (Allen 2010, Borrill 
and Tesfatsion 2012). This talk reviews progress for IBMs in ecology, details several 
remaining difficulties, and suggests clarification where needed.
Provisional Definition: For now, an IBM is provisionally considered to be a computer 
simulation in discrete time steps for the creation, disappearance and movement of a 
finite collection of discrete interacting entities. The germination, growth and death of a 
collection of individual trees on a plot of ground, or the birth, growth and reproduction of 
a collection of individual fish in a pond are the classic examples.
Challenges Met: Grimm and Railsback (2005) detail seven “challenges” that IBMs have 
faced in ecology: long time needed to develop the model, difficulty in analyzing results, 
lack of common language to communicate model and results, requirement for too much 
data, uncertainty and error propagation, lack of generality, lack of standards. Ecological 
IBM modelers have faced these challenges head on. They have collectively proposed 
and implemented a protocol (called the “ODD protocol”) for how a model is to be 
specified (Grimm et al 2006, 2010), and they have coalesced around a freely 
downloadable programming platform, NetLogo (Wilensky 1999, 2013), as a standard for 
developing and executing IBMs (Lytinen and Railsback 201, Railsback and Grimm 
2011). Moreover, NetLogo can be embedded within Mathematica (Wolfram Research) 
thereby endowing the IBM modeling module with the statistical and analytical tools of 
Mathematica’s powerful industry-standard mathematical programming environment. The 
steps by the ecological IBM modeling peer group go a long way toward resolving many, 
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but not all, of the reservations that have dogged IBMs since their inception. Here are 
some remaining problems.
Exclusionary Definitions: Despite their progress, ecological IBM modelers have also 
taken decisions that seem counter productive. They  employ an unnecessarily  exclusive 
definition of what counts as an IBM. Grimm and Railsback (2005), following Uchmanski 
and Grimm (1997), stipulate that to be considered an IBM in ecology, the model must 
satisfy four criteria:
1. Detail about each individual's life cycle must be present in the model, including the 
growth and development of each individual as it ages.
2. The dynamics of resources used by  individuals must be explicitly  represented - a 
"carrying capacity" cannot be used because it is supposedly  a population-level 
concept and that cannot be known to an individual.
3. Integers and not real numbers must used to represent the size of a population-the 
model must feature discrete events and not refer to rates.
4. Variability must be allowed and must exist among individuals of the same age -
environmental phenotypic variation, not heritable genetic variation, in as much as 
Grimm and Railsback (2005) consider evolutionary ecology as beyond the scope 
ecological IBMs. 
Inconsistent  Definitions: Grimm and Railsback (2005) acknowledge that these criteria 
rule out many models as IBMs. Notable among the excluded models are “predator-prey 
systems with individuals as discrete units with local interactions but no life cycles or 
variability among individuals”. However, this criterion conflicts with standard practice in 
the wider IBM community. Wolfram’s Mathematica website has a demonstration by 
Sayama (no date given) of a “real-time agent-based simulation of a predator-prey 
ecosystem” wherein rabbits run around in a square area and are chased by foxes. 
Castiglione (2006), in the Scholarpedia peer-reviewed open-access encyclopedia entry 
about agent-based modeling, also features a direct comparison of an an individual-
based fox-rabbit model compared with the venerable Volterra predator/prey model that 
is formulated as pair of coupled non-linear differential equations. The fox-rabbit models 
proposed as examples of IBMs would nonetheless be ruled out as ecological IBMs by 
Grimm and Railsback even though they are offered precisely as illustrations of IBMs in 
the wider IBM literature.
Why So Restrictive? In acknowledging that their definition is restrictive, Grimm and 
Railsback (2005) refer to models that seem in some respect to be IBMish but are not 
true IBMs, as “individual-oriented”. Why do Grimm and Railsback care so much about 
retaining their exclusionary  definition? Because they are committed to the ideal that 
“IBMs can lead to a fundamentally new view of ecological systems and processes”. 
They write that unlike true IBMs, “individually-oriented models do not allow us to fully 
trace the systems properties back to the behavior of the individual animals". The 
ecological IBM modelers regularly disparage the “classical framework” for describing 
ecological systems as “relatively simple and characterized by system-level state 
variables”, vs “the IBM view that ecological processes and systems emerge from the 
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traits of adaptive individuals”, 
and they view their exclusionary 
d e fi n i t i o n o f a n I B M a s 
necessary to accomplish this 
aim. Let us consider then 
whether the restrictions are in 
fact necessary to attaining a 
“fundamentally new view of 
ecological systems.”
“ I n d i v i d u a l l y O r i e n t e d ” 
Models Are Sufficient: I now 
review two examples of models 
that are IBMish but do not 
satisfy Grimm and Railsback’s 
(2005) criteria, and show that 
t h e s e d o r e p r e s e n t a 
fundamentally  new approach to 
formulating ecological models.
(1) Optimal Size of an Optimal 
Forager: In 1995 I published a 
model for how a lizard could 
learn to forage opt imal ly 
(Roughgarden, 1995). The 
model predicted the “optimal 
cutoff distance” such that all 
prey closer than this distance 
are taken and all prey beyond 
this distance are ignored. The 
optimal distance is that which 
maximizes the lizard’s rate of energy capture. A simple algorithm was exhibited that 
would allow a lizard to dynamically learn where the optimal cutoff was. The figure above 
illustrates the model using parameters estimated from field data for Anolis lizards in the 
Eastern Caribbean. The lower panel shows the optimal cutoff distance as a horizontal 
line. Prey are appearing randomly  at distances from 0 to 3 m away from the lizard. Each 
vertical line represents a prey item that was chased and caught. Notice that vertical 
lines rarely cross the optimal cutoff, and those that do are principally  at the beginning of 
the simulation when the lizard is still learning where the optimal cutoff distance is. The 
upper panel shows how the lizard’s energy capture rate within a day approaches the 
optimal capture rate, shown as a horizontal line. The realized capture rate fluctuates 
initially reflecting the lizard making mistakes by chasing insects beyond the optimal 
cutoff distance or ignoring insects in front of the optimal cutoff distance. The existence 
and quantitative properties of the optimal cutoff distance were tested and confirmed in 
field studies of Anolis lizards on the island of Anguilla (Shafir and Roughgarden 1998).
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Based on this model for the 
daily  energy capture by a lizard, 
the daily growth rate of a lizard 
could be predicted. The next 
figure shows a scatter plot of 
lizards’ daily growth increments 
from field data compared to that 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p r e d i c t e d 
assuming a lizard is an optimal 
forager. The open circles 
pertain to females and the 
closed circles to males. The 
theoretically predicted optimal 
growth rate is the solid curve. 
N o t i c e t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e 
agreement between actual 
growth increments and that 
expected from optimal foraging 
theory. Females cease growing 
and drop off the curve when 
they have reached a length of 
about 45 mm and the males 
drop off the growth curve at 
about 60 mm in length. These 
sizes are typical of adults on 
those Eastern Car ibbean 
islands with only one species of 
anole (the so-called solitary 
size). 
The next task is to predict why the lizards stop growing at the sizes they do in order to 
begin reproduction at that time. 
To accomplish this, the optimal 
growth rate curve can be 
integrated through time to yield 
a predicted curve of how the 
size of a lizard changes as it 
ages as shown in the adjacent 
figure. 
This theoretically predicted 
growth curve is then combined 
w i t h fi e l d e s t i m a t e s o f 
s u r v i v o r s h i p a n d w i t h a 
maternity function predicted 
f rom the fecundi ty of an 
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optimally foraging female as a 
function of the age at which she 
stops growth and switches to 
produc ing eggs. Fur ther, 
assuming density  dependence 
consistent with field data 
s h o w i n g a m a x i m u m 
abundance of 100 lizards per 
100 sq m, the steady state 
abundance as a function of 
b o d y s i z e i s p r e d i c t e d . 
According to density-dependent 
natural selection theory (K-
selection) the body size that maximizes the steady-state abundance is the optimal body 
size. The figure above shows the optimal body  size for females to be about 45 mm, as 
in fact observed. This example illustrates a complete and successful modeling protocol 
that begins with properties of an individual and culminates in an evolutionary prediction 
of the adult body size for lizards on an island in the absence of congeneric competitors.
The logic to this model is clearly bottom-up  and in the spirit of deriving population-level 
predictions from the explicit properties of individuals. Nonetheless, this model fails every 
one of the four Grimm/Railsback criteria. It would be considered as “individually 
oriented”, although not an IBM per se.
(2) Population dynamics of barnacles on an open stretch of rocky intertidal habitat. The 
figure below offers a schematic diagram of the system of ocean currents off the coast of 
C a l i f o r n i a a n d O r e g o n . 
B a r n a c l e s a r e s m a l l 
crustaceans whose adul t 
phase lives attached to rocks 
in the zone between low and 
high tides. These animals 
release tiny shrimp-like larvae 
that live in the surface waters 
eating phytoplankton until they 
grow to a size large enough to 
attach to a rock, whereupon 
they metamorphose in to 
adults. I developed a model for 
the population dynamics of 
t h e s e o r g a n i s m s 
(Roughgarden et al 1988). In 
the model, one equation 
pertains to the rate at which 
larvae settle out from the water 
onto vacant space on rocks. 
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Another equation pertains to the flow of larvae in the offshore currents. These two 
equations are coupled at the ocean-land boundary. Together they express a model for 
the population dynamics of barnacles. This model is formulated using a bottom-up logic 
based on the mechanisms for occupying space and the release of space following 
mortality.  This model might is a “mechanism based model,” or MBM, but the state 
variables are the number of barnacles per area of rock and the number of larvae per 
surface area of ocean, both of which are real numbers not restricted to integers. This 
model too fails to satisfy any of the Grimm/Railsback criteria, but could be considered 
“individually oriented” although not an IBM as such.
These examples show that “individually oriented” models are sufficient to achieve the 
goal of a “fundamentally new view of ecological systems and processes” as compared 
with the differential equations of classic population biology dating to the 1940’s and 
earlier. In contrast, IBMs as defined by Grimm and Railsback seem primarily applicable 
only to very large organisms such as vertebrates and trees, and even then might be 
worthwhile only for special applications where the individuals are each specifically 
identified, tagged and tracked. 
Individuality Confused with Agency: The difference between an individual based 
model and an agent based model (ABM) is confusing, with most workers considering 
these terms to be synonymous. For example, Castiglione (2006) writes, “An entity is an 
`agent’ if it has some degree of autonomy, that is, if it is distinguishable from its 
environment by some kind of spatial, temporal, or functional attribute. That is, an agent 
must be identifiable. Moreover, we further require that agents must have some 
autonomy of action and that they  must be able to engage in tasks in an environment 
without direct external control.” Thus, identifiability  and autonomy make an entity an 
agent in the IBM literature. So in this sense, “agent” and “individual” are roughly 
equivalent. Similarly, Peck (2012) writes  “I follow Railsback and Grimm and make no 
distinction” between IBMs and ABMs. He adds that “grains of sand ... might be 
considered model agents ... although they do not make choices.” 
However, I think it is better to use the term “agent” more narrowly--to refer specifically to 
a goal-seeking individual, where the goal is to increase the individual’s fitness, such as 
the optimally foraging lizard mentioned above. Furthermore, I require that prior to each 
realized action, an individual has a choice of one or more alternatives and choses the 
action it carries out according to the criterion that (it thinks) its fitness would thereby 
increase. So, to most workers an IBM and ABM are synonymous, where as in my 
definition, an ABM is a subset of IBM in which the individual chooses actions to pursue 
the goal of increasing its fitness. Choice and fitness-seeking define a biological agent.
Individuality Confused with Programming Metaphor: The definition of an IBM that 
most workers employ anticipates that the model will be developed using object oriented 
programming methods. The figure below is drawn from an Apple Computer publication 
about programming for the iPhone and iPad using the language Objective-C (Apple Inc. 
2010). The idea, say for a hand-calculator application, is that a constellation of objects 
exists, such as the number and function keys together with a viewing screen as well as 
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s o m e e n t i t i e s c a l l e d a 
controller and a model. An 
event transpires such as 
someone pressing a key like 
“7”, which triggers a controller 
t o c a u s e s a “ 7 ” t o b e 
displayed on the view. If 
another “7” is pressed the 
controller causes another “7” 
to be displayed, and if a “+” is 
pressed the controller sends 
the previous numbers to a 
model who adds them and 
sends the result back to the 
controller for display. The 
p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t t h i s 
programming metaphor envisions a bunch of interacting agents each with unique 
capabilities that collectively produce realize a function, such as a hand-calculator 
application, not immediately  evident from 
inspecting the properties of the individual 
agents. The notion of a hand-calculator 
could be said to emerge from the aggregate 
action of the constituent components. 
However, what the calculator does in any 
instance depends on random events. The 
calculator just sits there endlessly, so to 
speak, awaiting random keys presses from 
a user, and then exhibiting results, all 
without any direction.
The object-oriented programming metaphor 
differs from the procedural programming 
metaphor, which is perhaps best envisioned 
with the analogy of a recipe for cooking. 
Indeed, the now-classic language, Pascal, is 
explicitly set up to enforce writing a program 
like writing a recipe: list the ingredients at 
the beginning--what the variables are and 
what operations are allowed on them, and 
then move to how the ingredients are 
combined to produce a 
chocolate cake. Procedural 
programming envisions a 
directionality, from input to 
output, from beginning to 
end.
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Both these programming metaphors are useful in ecology, but should not be confused 
with the issue of whether a model is formulated bottom-up (ie, “individually oriented”) vs 
top down. Indeed, consider the populations comprising a food web. The figure above 
illustrates a simplified version of a complex food web  for the terrestrial community on St. 
Martin in the Eastern Caribbean (Roughgarden 1995). Like the hand-calculator 
previously mentioned, a community just sits there. Something happens to one 
component, like a rain squall that causes the insects on the forest floor to prosper, 
which in turn causes the spiders and lizards to prosper, which in turn causes the kestrel 
to prosper, which in turn causes increased deposition to the detritus layer and so on. 
The community sits there, bubbling away, without any direction--a perfect system for 
object-oriented programming where the populations in the community are the objects.
In contrast, a biological population is a directional entity. It grows in abundance, and 
adapts through evolution--a perfect system for procedural programming. It is ironic that 
object-oriented IBMs have been applied to population dynamics when the natural 
application of the approach is to communities. In any  case, the value of an object-
oriented programming vs a procedural programming metaphor should not be confused 
with the value of a bottom-up individual-oriented protocol vs a top-down protocol for 
model formulation
Conclusion: IBMs and ABMs originated in the 1960s when mainframe computers were 
first becoming available to ecological researchers. These computers provoked interest 
in using computer simulation for ecological modeling rather than relying on 
mathematical analysis. In judging the merits of model craftsmanship  based on 
simulation vs analysis, I usually  come down on the side of analysis. With simulation it 
may be impossible to drill down to what assumptions are responsible for conclusions, to 
discern the causal connections between initial conditions and results, and simulation 
invites unsophisticated and sloppy research together with naive hocus-pocus about the 
magic of emergence. 
Ecological workers with IBMs and ABMs not only bear the burden of avoiding an 
uncritical embrace computer simulation, they risk shooting themselves in the foot. First, 
they propose unnecessarily  restrictive definitions of what can count as an IBM, 
definitions that turn out to be inconsistent with usage of IBM workers in different 
domains. Second, they fail to distinguish between a living organism who acts through 
choice to increase its fitness and a dead particle. Third they confuse taking an individual 
organism as the conceptual starting point for ecological theorizing with the choice of 
programming metaphor--object oriented programming vs procedural programming. 
Ecological IBM and ABM workers need to clean up their act on these matters least they 
ruin a good thing.
Specifically, I recommend that the following definitions be adopted: (1) an IBM shall be 
any model for which the properties of the higher level are derived from properties at the 
lower level--ie, an IBM is any model formulated with bottom-up logic, any model that is 
“individual oriented”. (2) an ABM shall be any IBM in which the individuals at the lower 
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level are goal-seeking and take actions based on choices that maximize their goal. (3) 
Use of object-oriented programming vs procedural programming shall be considered 
irrelevant to the designation of a model as an IBM or ABM, and shall be undertaken 
according to what seems most natural to the application.
IBMs and ABMs, as distinct from computer simulation itself, offer three new conceptual 
advantages. First, they emphasize and implement a bottom up style of formulating 
ecological models--from a lower level to a higher level, eg.,  from an individual to social 
groups and thence to a population, or from organs to an organism. This perspective 
contrasts with traditional modeling in theoretical ecology based on the logistic and 
Lotka-Volterra competition and predator-prey equations. It also contrasts with the top-
down approach to animal behavior required by  Maynard Smith’s (1982) population-
genetic based solution concept of the evolutionarily-stable strategy (ESS), a approach 
that begins with the population’s gene pool and trickles down to individual behavior.
Second, IBMs and ABMs stress an alternative programming metaphor for ecological 
systems--the metaphor of object-oriented programming rather than procedural 
programming. This metaphor seems best for modeling ecological communities where 
the “objects” are species united through a common food (or interaction) web, and not for 
modeling populations whose dynamics still seem best represented through a procedural 
programming metaphor that represents the directionality  of population growth and 
natural selection. 
Third, the use of ABMs strongly endorses taking the individual as the fundamental focal 
or “first class” object for ecology and evolution--working up  from the individual to 
populations and communities or down from the individual to the genes within them. 
Resting evolutionary theory  on ABMs would contrast starkly with population genetics 
that takes the gene as the fundamental object, and works up from there to the 
phenotype, the population, and beyond. The agent oriented approach in ecology 
contradicts the widely shared perspective in evolutionary biology that, as Dawkins 
(1976) articulated, ``Our genes made us. We animals exist for their preservation and 
are nothing more than their throwaway survival machines.” Instead, according to agent-
based ecology, whole individuals are the primary actors on the evolutionary stage, and 
the genes within them but a stage crew of temporary  workers hitchhiking along for the 
evolutionary ride.
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